Israel must Be today feeling somewhat reticent about the Iranian deal backed by temporary United Nations Security Council members Turkey and Brazil. Iran has agreed to deposit some half of its current stockpile of processed uranium with Turkey, though has given no assurances about freezing or dismantling its nuclear program. The United states is dismayed its foreign policy agenda is foundering over the one thing guaranteed to upset domestic popular opinion - being seen as weak on the issue of the spread of WMD's.
However, it is surprising the State Department did not see this coming - Iran is a master-class in playing foreign policy games to protect its national interests. Turkey felt sufficiently neglected by its NATO partners and the US in particular that it closed its borders to the use of force against Iraq in 2003 and additionally has had the US President acknowledging the Armenian massacres of the early 20th century which are still are a sore point for the Turks. These issues combined with EU dithering over admitting Turkey left the Iranian issue as a clear one for the Turks to become engaged with - especially as they are neighbours.
For Brazil the issue is one where as a BRIC the nation can show it has some clought in foreign policy with the beautiful benefit that Iran is literally on the other side of the world. Likely mutual trade interests abound between the two nations.
It is probably fair to say, on reflection that the USA and Israel probably share some of the responsibility for this outcome. Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction in the 1980s and 1990s should have provided the opportunity for Israel to declare its stockpiles - or even eliminate them or have them transferred to the US for safe-keeping. Then joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would have left the nation with a superiority in conventional weapons and a strong moral position against anyone in the region developing them. There is a precedent by the way for unilateral nuclear disarmament and it was South Africa in the early 1990s - Israel's closest partner during the previous decade.
The position of the State Department under successive administrations resulted de facto in no substantial pressure on Israel to think through its possession of a nuclear deterrent which takes us to the situation we have no - any country seeking to become a regional player or hegemon knows that they have to develop the nuclear bomb. Lesson from Iraq: if you dither over development - or develop the capability above-ground, it is highly vulnerable to air strike.
These factors combine in a country which wishes to acquire a nuclear deterrent and possesses the 'will & skill' to simply get on with it. Israel defence planners has feared the development of an islamic bomb and now they seem close to having to realise this fear.
Choices are few, trying a re-run of the osirak reactor strike on Iraq in 1980 are not straight-forward, plus the aircraft have to fly across the middle east to reach the target.
The real way to catch the Iranian fox is to have had them spend billions on trying to acquire the weapons and then change the rules of the game;
One way is to develop an effective missile defence (though the cold war showed that MIRV'ing warheads and having lots of missiles could overcome a defence) or,
Second to declare or get rid of your own capability so as to paint Iran as the bad guy should they pursue development further. Not a pretty story.
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